BUON TRAP REVEAL

by David Nuttle

While helping direct the Village Defense Program in S. Vietnam, 1961-62, a number of facts not previously confirmed to me were revealed. A classic experience is revelations via a defense inspection visit to one of our Montagnard defended villages, Buon Trap. I made a visit to that village with my radio operator, Paul K., who was doing a field test of his new HT-2 radio. Since Boun Trap was in an area contested by communist forces, we had a well-armed and combat experienced Montagnard Stike Force company of 120 fighters.

The Strike Force commander, Y-Ju, was inspecting the security fence, alarm systems, the protective bunkers for women and children, guard positions and fighting bunkers for armed and trained volunteer village defenders of Buon Trap. At the last stage of this inspection, we were attacked by an estimated PAVN battalion, a well-armed force of at least 220 N. Viet communist soldiers in uniform, firing from behind trees in the jungle surrounding Boun Trap.

They were blowing bugles for attack signals and to hopefully cause us concern.

We later discovered that an ARVN (S. Viet) battalion was on a hilltop less than 2-miles away observing our battle. As I had previously discovered the Viets would not come to the aid of Montagnard since the Viets had been fighting them for over 2,000 years. Thus, when Montagnard did battle with Viet communists, it was just one enemy fighting another enemy.

Our battle with the PAVN forces was conducted by 120 Strike Force Montagnard aided by 30 Montagnard volunteer village defenders from Buon Trap. It soon became obvious that PAVN forces were conducting a lengthy sustained battle with the objective of causing our forces to run out of ammunition. We realized we would probably need an ammunition drop. Paul's HT-2 radio was working great, and he called the GVN's (S. Viet's) Air Force whose commander had agreed to make such drops to us in an emergency. When their C-47 arrived to make our requested ammo drop, the aircraft was fired upon by two PAVN anti-aircraft guns. Thus, the C-47 pilot elected to flee the area so the drop did not occur. Our ammo supply was getting low at this point in our battle, and I was concerned.

I then used Paul's HT-2 radio to call an NCO friend, Mac M., who was the pilot for a Beaver aircraft he used to fly MAAG officers around S. Vietnam. I knew that Mac was under orders, from the U. S. Army commander of his MAAG detachment, to not do anything to help any Special Operations personnel even if they were under attack. Mac was a good friend, so I asked him to ignore his orders and meet our logistics team at the BMT airport some 20 miles away. I indicated our team would help temporarily remove seats from the Beaver and load ammo and three "kickers" to push ammo crates out the Beaver's door. Mac agreed, and I advised him of the PAVN anti-aircraft guns telling him to make only one drop pass over the village at tree-top level. This ammo drop was successful, and we made certain to keep Mac's role in the drop a secret from his MAAG commander. The PAVN forces broke off their attack soon after our ammo drop. I assumed they observed our drop and decided we would not soon be running out of ammo.

Within a year, we had 60 villages in our Village Defense Project with an average of 30 volunteer defenders in each village. We also had 10 Montagnard Strike Force companies helping to protect villages and fighting an average of three battles weekly against Viet Cong and PAVN communist forces and winning nearly every battle. POTUS JFK endorsed this program but after his assassination, VPOTUS LBJ, upon becoming POTUS, ordered all population protection efforts terminated and Special Forces were directed to construct as well as fully defend forts on the Laos-SVN border. A flawed decision, allowing communists to soon gain control of the SVN populations. In my opinion, this decision was a major cause of why the U. S. lost the Vietnam War. POTUS LBJ confirmed to me, several times, he was a master at saving defeat from "the-jaws-of-victory."

The detailed history of said Village Defense Project detailed and documented in a book entitled "Vietnam's High Ground," by J.P. Harris (a distinguished historian.) I had a few new revelations from each Montagnard village I worked with. After my Vietnam service I found that the USAF recorded my combat status as performed in the Inactive USAF Reserve. USAF would did give me a Honorable discharge but no DD-214 form showing my active duty. I was officially serving with CIA Special Operations and DOD did not want to give CIA credit for anything. DOD even prevented CIA Special Ops Officers from receiving medical services from the VA. Once again, the extreme hatred of Special Ops by our regular U. S. military commanders was once more confirmed to me.

Life is a learning experience every step of the way and some steps may be somewhat of a hazard that teaches you more.